Consensus in the Age of Blockchains by Bano, Shehar et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
71
1.
03
93
6v
2 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
4 N
ov
 20
17
1
SoK: Consensus in the Age of Blockchains
Shehar Bano1, Alberto Sonnino1, Mustafa Al-Bassam1, Sarah Azouvi1, Patrick McCorry1,
Sarah Meiklejohn1, and George Danezis12
1University College London, United Kingdom
2The Alan Turing Institute
Abstract—The blockchain initially gained traction in 2008
as the technology underlying Bitcoin [105], but now has been
employed in a diverse range of applications and created a
global market worth over $150B as of 2017. What distinguishes
blockchains from traditional distributed databases is the ability
to operate in a decentralized setting without relying on a trusted
third party. As such their core technical component is consensus:
how to reach agreement among a group of nodes. This has been
extensively studied already in the distributed systems community
for closed systems, but its application to open blockchains has
revitalized the field and led to a plethora of new designs.
The inherent complexity of consensus protocols and their
rapid and dramatic evolution makes it hard to contextualize
the design landscape. We address this challenge by conducting
a systematic and comprehensive study of blockchain consensus
protocols. After first discussing key themes in classical consensus
protocols, we describe: (i) protocols based on proof-of-work
(PoW), (ii) proof-of-X (PoX) protocols that replace PoW with
more energy-efficient alternatives, and (iii) hybrid protocols that
are compositions or variations of classical consensus protocols.
We develop a framework to evaluate their performance, security
and design properties, and use it to systematize key themes in
the protocol categories described above. This evaluation leads us
to identify research gaps and challenges for the community to
consider in future research endeavours.
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchains—the technology at the foundation of Bitcoin
and other cryptocurrencies—have been hailed as a major
disruptive innovation with the potential to transform most
industries. The total global market capital of blockchain-
based tokens and cryptocurrencies has reached over $150B
as of 2017, and is expected to grow further [113]. While the
projected capabilities and value of the blockchain might seem
overly optimistic, its key properties of integrity, resilience,
and transparency make it an attractive option for a number
of applications. The blockchain is a decentralized, replicated,
immutable and tamper-evident log: data on the blockchain can-
not be deleted, and anyone can read data from the blockchain
and verify its correctness. An important implication of this
architecture is disintermediation: multiple untrusted or semi-
trusted parties can directly and transparently interact with each
other without the presence of a trusted intermediary. This
makes blockchains immediately relevant to banks and financial
institutions which incur huge middleman costs in settlements
and other back office operations. A number of big players
are actively exploring the feasibility of blockchains, including
the Bank of England [23], the Bank of America [47] and the
IMF [64]. However, blockchains are not just restricted to the
financial industry; the list of use cases is long [80], ranging
from voting [5] and government and public records [12, 130],
to the sharing economy [3, 7, 8] and social media [1, 11].
We are at a crucial point in the evolution of blockchains.
The major hurdle in the widespread adoption of blockchains
is their performance and scalability—while improvements
have been made, they are nowhere near as ubiquitous as
their traditional counterparts. These properties are deeply
related to the consensus protocol—the core component of
the blockchain—and we believe this is where future efforts
to improve blockchain performance and scalability should be
concentrated. The consensus protocol specifies how to get
multiple nodes to agree on a value—that is, if a data item
should be added to the blockchain. Two key properties of a
consensus protocol are: (i) requests from correct clients are
eventually processed (liveness), and (ii) if an honest node
accepts (or rejects) a value then all other honest nodes make
the same decision (safety/consistency). Consensus is not a new
problem: the distributed systems community has extensively
studied it for decades, and developed robust and practical
protocols that can tolerate faulty and malicious nodes [44, 89].
However, these protocols were designed for closed groups.
Bitcoin’s fundamental innovation was to enable consensus
among an open, decentralized group of nodes. This was
achieved via a leader election based on proof-of-work (PoW):
all nodes attempt to find the solution to a hash puzzle and
the node that wins adds the next block to the blockchain.
Due to its probabilistic leader election process combined with
performance fluctuations in decentralized networks, Bitcoin
offers only weak consistency: different nodes might end up
having different views of the blockchain leading to forks.
Additionally, Bitcoin suffers from poor performance which
cannot be remedied without fundamental redesign [49] and
its PoW consumes a huge amount of energy [131]. This
has led to a plethora of proposals for new consensus pro-
tocols [24]. Some replace Bitcoin’s PoW with more energy-
efficient alternatives [102], while others modify the original
design of Bitcoin for better performance [61]. To achieve
strong consistency and similar performance as mainstream
payment processing systems like Visa and PayPal, a number
of recent proposals seek to repurpose classical consensus
protocols for use in decentralized blockchains [133].
To date there has been no systematic and comprehensive
study of blockchain consensus protocols (though there exist
a few short surveys based on selected systems which we
discuss in Section II-B). This incurs two major challenges.
First, a comprehensive survey of blockchains would doubtless
include a discussion of classical consensus protocols. How-
2ever, the literature is vast and complex, which makes it hard
to be tailored to blockchains. Second, conducting a survey
of consensus protocols in blockchains has its own difficulties.
Though young, the field is characterised by high-volume, fast-
paced work. Since 2014, on average about 250 papers per
year have appeared on the topic of blockchains. A reasonable
approach is to only consider work published in reputable
venues, but here the bulk of the work is published in non peer-
reviewed venues and as white papers for industrial platforms.
We fill this gap by making three contributions. First, we
conduct a comprehensive survey mapping how consensus
protocols have evolved from the classical distributed systems
use case to their application to blockchains. We first discuss
key themes in classical consensus protocols (Section IV), and
then shift focus to PoW approaches popularized by Bitcoin
(Section V). Section VI discusses proof-of-X (PoX) schemes,
which is an umbrella term for systems that replace PoW with
more useful and energy-efficient alternatives. In the next two
sections, we look at hybrid systems based on novel com-
positions of classical consensus primitives, or that combine
classical consensus with PoW or PoX (Sections VII and VIII).
Our second contribution is a common evaluation framework
to visualize the capabilities of blockchain consensus protocols
(Table I). Instead of considering individual protocols which
would be clearly infeasible, we map out the landscape by ex-
tracting and evaluating high-level design themes in blockchain
consensus protocols. Finally, we present a discussion of open
research challenges and potential directions in the design of
future blockchain consensus protocols (Section IX).
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Background
We describe key concepts in blockchains. For details, we
refer the readers to the excellent work by Bonneau et al. [33].
The blockchain is a decentralized, replicated, resilient and
transparent data store that allows anyone to read data and
verify its correctness. In permissioned blockchains, all the
node identities are known (trsuted or semi-trusted), and are
controlled by a single entity or federation. Permissionless
blockchains are fully decentralized and anyone can run a node
and join the network. Data is stored on the blockchain as
blocks. The blockchain is typically implemented as a linked
list in which pointers to previous blocks have been replaced
with the cryptographic hash of the previous block. The hash
serves as the id of the previous block, and also verifies its
integrity. This pattern is repeated in each block, resulting in a
hash chain in which each block implicitly verifies integrity of
the entire chain before it, and tampering with previous data is
detectable. It is also possible to store the blockchain as a tree-
like structure called the hash tree or the Merkle tree [135]. A
transaction specifies some transformation on the state of the
blockchain. If a transaction passes validity and verification
checks (transaction validation), it is included in a candidate
block (a set of transactions) to be added to the blockchain.
Nodes in the network participate in a collaborative protocol
(consensus) to agree on whether the block should be added
to the blockchain. In probabilistic consensus protocols like
Bitcoin’s PoW, nodes might end up having different views of
the blockchain (forks) because of latency in propagation of
transactions, and faulty or malicious nodes. A related concept
is that of double-spending where a transaction consumes
an asset which has already been consumed by a previous
transaction. Consensus protocols might have a leader node
that coordinates with other nodes to reach consensus, and for
appending a final, committed value to the blockchain. The
leader is usually effective for an interval called an epoch or
a round. If the epoch expires (or upon a fault), a new leader
is elected. Bitcoin transactions can include reference to well-
known deterministic scripts that operate on the transaction
inputs and produce some outputs. To make the blockchain
a general-purpose platform, scripts are being replaced with
smart contracts. A smart contract is self-executing code that
enforces a digital contract.
B. Related Work
We believe that our study represents the most compre-
hensive systematic investigation of consensus protocols in
blockchains to date. Below we list work that illuminates
different subsets of this space and supports our study.
1) Surveys and Systematization: Bonneau et al. [33] present
a comprehensive systematization of Bitcoin and other cryp-
tocurrencies. Narayanan and Clark [106] trace the academic
pedigree of Bitcoin technical components. Zohar [141] pro-
vides an overview of scalability and security issues in cryp-
tocurrencies especially Bitcoin, emphasizing the role of in-
centivization in PoW blockchains to enforce security. Cachin
and Vukolic´ [41] discuss key concepts in classical consen-
sus and describe a selection of permissioned blockchains.
Vukolic´ [133] emphasizes the weak consistency of PoW
systems. He advocates the shift to classical BFT protocols
that offer strong consistency, but notes challenges in their
scalability which are discussed in a previous paper by the
same author [132]. Both these papers focus on permissioned
blockchains. Yli-Huumo et al. [138] conduct a survey (based
on 41 papers) of topic trends in blockchain research and find
that 80% of the papers are on Bitcoin and the remaining
20% are dominated by security and privacy in blockchains.
They highlight concrete evaluation criteria and scalability as
neglected areas of research.
2) Evaluation: BLOCKBENCH [56] is a framework for
evaluating the security and performance of private blockchains.
Their evaluation reveals that due to design gaps, popular
blockchains lag far behind traditional database systems when
processing traditional data processing workloads. Their rec-
ommendations include systematic benchmarking, improved
usability, and revitalizing classical database design principles
such as modularity, exploiting hardware primitives, sharding,
and support for declarative languages. Gervais et al. [68]
present a quantitative framework to evaluate the security and
performance of PoW blockchains. They focus on optimal
adversarial strategies for double-spending and selfish mining,
while accounting for network propagation, different block
sizes, block generation intervals, information propagation
mechanism, and the impact of eclipse attacks. Croman et
3al. [49] present metrics to evaluate the resource costs and
performance of Bitcoin with a focus on scalability. They show
that even with reparametrization, Bitcoin can only achieve a
maximum throughput of 27 tx/s with a latency of 12 seconds.
III. SYSTEMATIZATION METHODOLOGY
Capturing a longitudinal and representative view of a topic
as rich as consensus is challenging. We describe our method-
ology for compiling the literature on which this work is based,
and describe the review process and the evaluation framework.
We consider consensus in classical systems and blockchains
separately because there is a significant difference in the
maturity of these two fields.
A. Classical consensus
The area of classical consensus is well-established and
spans decades. Our goal is to present sufficient background on
classical consensus to contextualize its subsequent application
to blockchains. The surveyed literature comprised of well-
known seminal works in the area, based on their influence
and subsequent citations. It was also supported by Cachin et
al.’s comprehensive book on this topic [38] and Schneider’s
classical survey on state machine replication [121].
B. Consensus in Blockchains
Consensus in blockchains is more involved because it is a
high-volume, high-churn evolving area of research.
1) Compiling and Reviewing Survey Material: We used a
combination of sources to compile our survey material because
the bulk of the work in this area originates in non-academic
venues, and the usual metrics such as impact (the number
of citations) cannot be employed in this young field. We
first compiled a seed-list of literature to survey based on
a creditable, actively maintained bibliographic repository on
blockchain research by Christian Decker from ETH Zu¨rich.1
We augmented this list with work that cited peer-reviewed
papers in it, and with other relevant papers of which we
were aware. After further refinement, we ended up with the
papers listed in Appendix A, which are categorized by PoW,
PoX, or hybrid. For each category, a subset of representative
papers were selected, prioritizing papers published in academic
venues, and papers that significantly advance the field.
2) Evaluation Framework: Our evaluation framework de-
scribes systems along three broad themes: security, perfor-
mance, and design aspects. In terms of security, we consider
three properties: consistency (i.e., whether or not the system
will reach consensus on a proposed value), transaction cen-
sorship resistance (i.e., the system’s resilience to malicious
nodes suppressing transactions), and DoS resistance (i.e., the
system’s resilience to DoS attacks against nodes involved in
consensus). In terms of performance, we consider throughput
(i.e., the maximum rate at which values can be agreed upon by
the consensus protocol), scalability (i.e., the system’s ability to
1Other similar repositories by Aljosha Judmayer [81] and Brett Scott [123]
(discontinued after 2016) are also note-worthy; Decker’s collection overlaps
with both of these.
achieve greater throughput when consensus involves a larger
number of nodes) and latency (i.e., the time it takes from when
a value is proposed, until when consensus has been reached
on it). In terms of design, some properties are relevant only to
their associated categories, so we defer explanation of them
to sections where they are relevant. A complete glossary is
included in Appendix B.
We use Table I as a common reference throughout our
discussion on PoW, PoX, and hybrid consensus, focusing on
parts of the table relevant to each category. Unless explicitly
stated, we always assume partial synchrony (i.e., messages
might be delayed in the network but eventually arrive within
some bound). The wide view captured by this table aids in
visualizing evaluation of the field.
IV. CLASSICAL CONSENSUS
Safety in distributed systems has been studied since the
1970s, alongside the rise of distributed databases and trans-
actions. Jim Gray, in 1978, proposed the two-phase commit
protocol [73], allowing a transaction manager to atomically
commit a transaction, depending on different resources held
by a distributed set of resource managers. Transaction commit
protocols enable distributed processing, and thus scalability,
but do not provide resilience against faulty resource managers,
or more generally nodes. In fact, two-phase commit suffers a
deadlock in case a resource manager fails to complete the
protocol, requiring the introduction of more complex three-
round protocols allowing recovery [124]—i.e. the distributed
resource managers being able to release the locks held on
resources. Since potentially a crucial resource may only be
available on a single resource manager, any failures inhibit
progress towards accepting dependent transactions.
The need for consensus, or atomic broadcast, protocols
in distributed systems originates from the need to provide
resilience against failures across multiple nodes holding repli-
cas of databases. The primitive is closely associated with the
state machine replication paradigm [121] for building reliable
distributed computations: any computation is expressed as a
state machine, accepting messages to mutate its state. Given
that a set of replicas start at the same initial state, and can
agree on a common sequence of messages, then they may all
privately evolve the state of the computation and correctly
maintain consistency across the replicated databases they
hold, despite failures or network variations. The underlying
consensus protocols are characterized by the communication
model, as well as the failure model, assumed.
According to the taxonomy by Dwork et al. [58], net-
works may be syncronous or asynchronous, or offer eventual
synchrony. In a synchronous network the delays messages
may suffer can be bound by some time ∆. On the other
hand, in asynchronous networks messages may be delayed
arbitrarily, and there exists no reliable bound ∆ for their
delay. Networks with partially synchronous, or eventually
synchronous networks, assume that the network at some
stage will eventually be synchronous despite potentially a
long period of asynchrony. Fischer et al. [63] show that
deterministic protocols for consensus are impossible in the
4fully asynchronous case, and have known solutions in the
synchronous case (also known as the “Byzantines General’s
Problem”). The impossibility theorem is also not taking into
account computational bounds on the work nodes may do—
something that is exploited by both Nakamoto consensus, as
well as other cryptographic solutions [39] to overcome it.
Different failure models have also been considered in the lit-
erature. In the crash failure model, nodes may fail at any time,
but they fail by stopping to process, emit or receive messages.
Usually failed nodes remain silent forever, although a num-
ber of distributed protocols consider recovery. On the other
hand, in the byzantine failures model, failed nodes may take
arbitrary actions—including sending and receiving sequences
of messages that are specially crafted to defeat properties of
the consensus protocol. In the network security literature those
nodes would be considered malicious or collectively controlled
by an adversary. Thus the byzantine setting is of relevance to
security-critical settings, and traditional consensus protocols
tolerating only crash failures such as Paxos [89], viewstamped
replication [110] and the more modern Raft [111] or Zab [82]
cannot be used, unmodified, in adversarial settings.
In terms of the properties expected from a consensus
protocol, we consider liveness and safety as enumerated by
Cachin et al. [41]. For liveness, validity ensures that if a node
broadcasts a message, eventually this message will be ordered
within the consensus, and agreement ensures that if a message
is delivered to one honest node, it will eventually be delivered
to all honest nodes. For safety, integrity guarantees that only
broadcast messages are delivered, and they are delivered only
once, and total order ensures that all honest nodes extract the
same order for all delivered messages.
Consensus refers to ‘agreement’ by all nodes, not ‘choice’:
consensus protocols are not voting protocols ensuring that all
or a majority of nodes agree to the total order, or any single
message—the order may be arbitrary or even controlled by
an adversary. A number of extensions to consensus protocols
include a validation step, that ensures the transactions accepted
are valid—however the validation rules must be deterministic
and uniform across all nodes, and does not afford nodes any
discretion about what constitutes a valid message.
An exemplary protocol implementing consensus in the the
byzantine and partially synchronous setting is Practical Byzan-
tine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) by Castro and Liskov [43]. The
protocol operates in a sequence of views, each coordinated by
a leader—a pattern also used in Paxos [89]. Within each view
the leader orders messages, and propagates them through a
three step reliable broadcast to the replicas. Replicas monitor
the leader for safety, as well as for liveness, and can propose
a view change in case the leader is unavailable or malicious.
Safety is guaranteed within the asynchronous network setting;
liveness on the other hand is only guaranteed within a partially
synchronous setting, since replicas rely on time-outs to detect
a faulty leader. The key complexity of PBFT lies in the view-
change sub protocol, that needs to ensure agreement on the
new leader and view, as well as guarantee safety of messages
agreed in previous views. The basic protocol requires O(n2)
messages for n replicas to achieve consensus, where n is the
number of nodes. The properties of the protocol are guaranteed
if n = 3f + 1, where f is the number of byzantine nodes.
The issue of storage efficiency, a topic of great relevance to
blockchain protocols, is discussed in PBFT: a naive implemen-
tation of state machine replication, based on consensus, would
store the full sequence of actions. The proposed solution relies
on replicas agreeing checkpoint actions. Those checkpoints are
co-signed by all replicas, and allow them to only store the
current state of the system, and discard the past sequence that
led to the checkpoint state.
PBFT and other consensus protocols employ replication to
achieve resilience against failures, not scalability. In fact the
traditional literature on byzantine consensus does not discuss
distribution of resources, in the context of a distributed or
sharded database, with the exception of a less known joint
work by Gray and Lamport on combining atomic broadcast
with atomic commit [72]. As a result, one expects systems
employing byzantine consensus to see this protocol become
a bottleneck, since its trivial application would require all
transactions to be sequenced by the quorum of n nodes—
using protocols that are slower than asking a single processor
to sequence them.
V. PROOF-OF-WORK CONSENSUS
In 2008, Bitcoin [105] was published by a pseudonymous
author Satoshi Nakamoto; it has since gone on to become one
of the most successful cryptocurrencies of modern times. The
key innovation of Bitcoin is its use of proof-of-work (PoW) to
achieve consensus—also called Nakamoto consensus after its
originator—in a fully decentralized, permissionless network.
A. Nakamoto consensus
While the technical components of Bitcoin originate in
previous academic literature, their composition in Bitcoin to
achieve consensus is novel. The idea of proof-of-work was
first presented by Dwork and Naor in 1993 as a technique
for combatting spam mail, by requiring the email sender to
compute the solution to a mathematical puzzle to prove that
some computational work was performed [59].
PoW was independently proposed in 1997 for Hashcash by
Back, another system for fighting spam [22]. In Hashcash, the
computational puzzle is finding a SHA-1 hash of a header
including the email recipient’s address and current date, such
that the hash contains at least 20 bits of leading zeros. As the
hashing algorithm is pre-image resistant, the puzzle can be
solved only by including random nonces in the header until
the resulting hash meets the leading zeros requirement. These
guesses require a significant amount of computational work,
so a valid hash is considered to be a PoW.
Nakamoto consensus is derived from Hashcash [22]. It
replaces Hashcash’s SHA-1 hashing with two successive SHA-
2 hashes, and requires valid hashes to have a value below a
target integer value t. The difficulty of the puzzle is therefore
adjustable: decreasing t increases the number of guesses (and
thus work) required to generate a valid hash. The nodes that
generate hashes are called miners and the process is referred
to as mining. Miners calculate hashes of candidate blocks of
5TABLE I: Evaluation of blockchain consensus protocols. Notation for binary values: ✓ has property, ✗ does not have property. Notation for non-binary values: has property, partially has property, does not have
property. Notation for meta-information: – the property does not apply to the given category, ? the value could not be extracted, ! the value is missing. The rows correspond to selected systems in each protocol category; a full
list of the corresponding citations is provided in Appendix A. A list of terms is included in Appendix B. In the Msg. column (message complexity), n refers to the number of participants, and c is the size of the committee.
Systems
code
avail.
Committee
Formation
(Resources)
Strong
consistency
Single Committee
Committee
Configura-
tion
Inter-Committee Consensus
Incentives
(Join,Participate)
Leader Msg.
Multiple Committee
Intra-
Committee
Configura-
tion
Intra-committee Consensus
Mediated Incentives
Safety
Transaction
Censorship
Resistance
DoS
Resistance
Adversary
Model
Performances
Throughput Scalable Latency Exp. Setup
h
y
b
r
i
d
ByzCoin [84] ✓ PoW ✓
Rolling
(single)
✓✗ Internal O(n) - - - ✓ 33% 1000 tx/s 1 ✗ 10–20s 1 Real
Solidus [16] ✗ PoW ✓
Rolling
(single)
✓✓ External O(n2) - - - ✗ 33% - - - -
Algorand [70] ✗ Lottery ✓ Full swap ✗✗ Internal O(n2) - - - ✗ 33% 90 tx/h 2 ✗ 40s 2 Real
Hyperledger [134] ✓ Permissioned ✓ Static - Flexible Flexible - - - ✓ 33% 110k tx/s 3 ✗ <1s 3 Real
RSCoin [51] ✓ Permissioned ✓ Static - Internal O(n) ✗ Client ✗ ✓ 33% 2k tx/s 4 ✓ <1s 4 Real
Elastico [95] ✗ PoW ✓ Full swap ✓✗ Internal O(n2)
Dynamic
(Random)
! ! ✗ 33%
16 blocks in
110s 5
✓
110s for 16
blocks 5
Real
Omniledger [85] ✗ PoW/PoX ✓
Rolling
(subset)
✓✗ Internal O(n)
Dynamic
(Random)
Client ✗ ✓ 33% ≈10k tx/s 6 ✓ ≈1s 6 Real
Chainspace [18] ✓ Flexible ✓ Flexible ✗✗ Internal O(n2) ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ 33% 350 tx/s 7 ✓ <1s 7 Real
p
r
o
o
f
-
o
f
-
X
Ouroboros [83] ✗ Lottery ✗ Full swap ✓✓ Internal O(nc) – – – ✗ 50% 257.6 tx/s 9 ✗ 20s Simulation
Praos [52] ✗ Stake ✗
Rolling
(subset)
✓✓ Internal O(1) – – – ✗ 50% – – – –
Snow-white [50] ✗ Stake ✗ Full swap ✓✓ Internal O(1) – – – ✗ 50% 100-150 tx/s 9 ✓ ? Simulation
PermaCoin [102] ✓ PoW/PoR11 ✗
Rolling
(single)
✗✓ Internal O(1) – – – ✓ 50% – ✗ – –
SpaceMint [77] ✓ PoS ✗
Rolling
(single)
✗✓ Internal O(1) – – – ✓ 50% ? ✗ 600s Simulation
Intel PoET [79] ✓ TH12 ✗
Rolling
(single)
✗✓ Internal O(1) – – – ✓ TH12 1000 tx/s 10 ✓ – Real
REM [139] ✗ TH12 ✗
Rolling
(single)
✗✓ Internal O(1) – – – ✓ TH12 ! ✓ – Real
p
r
o
o
f
-
o
f
-
w
o
r
k
Bitcoin [105] ✓ PoW ✗
Rolling
(single)
✗✓ Internal O(1) – – – ✓ 50% 7 tx/s ✗ 600s Real
Bitcoin-NG [61] ✗ PoW ✗
Rolling
(single)
✗✓ Internal O(1) – – – ✓ 50% 7 tx/s ✗ <1s Simulation
GHOST [126] ✗ PoW ✗
Rolling
(single)
✗✓ Internal O(1) – – – ✓ 50% – ✗ – –
DECOR+HOP [92] ✗ PoW ✗
Rolling
(single)
✗✓ Internal O(1) – – – ✓ 50% 30 tx/s 8 ✗ 60s Simulation
Spectre [125] ✗ PoW ✗
Rolling
(single)
✗✓ Internal O(1) – – – ✓ 50% – ✗ – –
1 144 nodes/committee.
2 50k nodes/committee.
3 4 nodes/committee (corresponding to BFTSmart [14]).
4 3 nodes/committee. 10 committees.
5 100 nodes/committee. 16 committees.
6 72 nodes/committee (12.5% adversary). 25 committees.
7 4 nodes/committee. 15 committees.
8 1 minute average interval; 1 block = 1 MB.
9 40 nodes.
10 As reported in a blog post [6].
11 proof-of-retrievability.
12 Trusted Hardware.
6transactions to be added to the blockchain, and are rewarded
with new coins if they find a valid block. The value t is reset by
the network every 2016 blocks such that miners are successful
(and can append a block to the blockchain) probabilistically
every 10 minutes (also called the inter-block interval).
B. Forks
Forks in the blockchain may occur if two miners find two
different blocks that build on the same previous block. This
is resolved by PoW consensus, which orders transactions and
makes double-spending expensive. In the original paper, forks
are resolved in the consensus rules by accepting the ‘longest
chain, which has the greatest proof-of-work effort invested
in it’ as the correct one. In practice, this is implemented as
the chain with most accumulated work, as it is possible for a
shorter chain to have more proof-of-work than a longer chain.
To double-spend assets on a PoW blockchain, an attacker
must have sufficient computing power to be able to create
a fork of the blockchain that has more accumulated work
than the chain that is to be overridden. Thus the threat model
assumes an adversary that has the majority of the computing
power on the network (referred to as a 51% attack) can
outpower the remaining computational power in generating a
chain with the most accumulated work. The security threshold
of the network is the percentage of computing power required
to conduct a 51% attack. Decker and Wattenhofer showed
that due to the delays in blocks propagation in the Bitcoin
network, increasing the block size and decreasing the inter-
block interval increases the chance of forks occurring [54],
as delayed miners may waste effort in attempting to mine on
top of blocks that are no longer the latest ones. As a result,
the network becomes more susceptible to 51% attacks from a
miner that does not suffer from delays.
C. Scaling Bitcoin
Bitcoin currently has a hardcoded blocksize limit of 1MB
per block, and a 10 minute block frequency target. Gervais et
al. [68] showed that Bitcoin’s block frequency can be reduced
to 1 minute per block without reducing the security threshold
of the existing network, modelling the bandwidth distribution
of the network around real-world broadband data.
Forks might still occur in PoW blockchains despite coun-
termeasures to avoid them. New policies have been proposed
for the selection of the main chain in the forked blockchain
to obtain a more resilient and scalable system than Bitcoin.
GHOST [126] exploits blocks that are not on the main chain,
achieving higher transaction rates without undermining Bitcoin
security. Unlike Bitcoin’s linear blockchain, GHOST organizes
blocks in a tree structure. The tree is shaped by the blocks
that successful miners choose to extend. The chain selection
algorithm chooses the heaviest path as main chain, where a
block’s weight depends on how dense its subtree is.
The challenge of scaling PoW blockchains is that the
more one increases throughput (block size) or the more one
decreases latency (block frequency), the lower the resilience
of the network to 51% attacks. A common theme in enhancing
PoW consensus is to improve performance while maintaining
the security threshold of the network without requiring nodes
and miners to upgrade their network connections.
Bitcoin-NG [61] shares Bitcoin’s trust model, but improves
performance by separating leader election from transaction
serialization (i.e., appending them to the blockchain). In each
epoch, a leader is selected via PoW as in Bitcoin. Unlike
Bitcoin, the leader can continue to append transactions to the
blockchain for the duration of its epoch, until a new leader
is elected. This allows latency to be limited only by the
network’s propagation delay, and bandwidth to be limited only
by the processing capacity of the nodes. Another approach for
improving performance, used by Spectre [125], is to allows
miners to mine blocks concurrently by replacing the ‘linear’
blockchain structure with a block-DAG. Off-chain approaches
to improve Bitcoin scalability such as the Lightning Net-
work [116] have also been proposed, where parties can execute
transactions off the main consensus path, and submit only the
final state to the blockchain. A more detailed discussion of
off-chain solutions is outside the scope of this work.
D. Mining Centralization
To reduce the variance of miners’ rewards, miners often
aggregate resources and share rewards among themselves via
pooled mining protocols. However, mining pools undermine
decentralization and are vulnerable to transaction censorship
by a malicious pool manager (needed to map transactions to
blocks) [97]. To mitigate such attacks, the PoW mechanism
should be fair: the number of valid blocks mined by a miner
should be proportional to its computing power in the network.
A number of techniques have been proposed to create decen-
tralized mining pools [97, 103]. SmartPool [97] implements a
practical decentralized mining pool through an Ethereum smart
contract, with the smart contract replacing the traditional pool
manager. On the other hand, Miller et al. [103] discourage
mining pools by proposing non-outsourceable proof-of-work
puzzles, in which rewards can be entirely stolen from the pool
manager by the entity solving the puzzle, without producing
any evidence of its implication.
DECOR+HOP [92] enforces fairness between miners by
allowing them to share the profit when competing blocks
are generated. Such efforts aim to avoid centralization by
giving miners the same reward and guaranteeing low vari-
ance as if they were mining with centralized pools. More-
over, DECOR+HOP improves Bitcoin performance by using
‘header-first propagation’, where the block header is sent
first, and nodes attempt to reconstruct the full block from
transactions that they have already heard about. If there are
missing transactions, the node fetches them from its peers.
E. Incentives
The security of Nakamoto consensus relies on economi-
cally incentivising miners to validate and mine blocks, by
rewarding them with new coins. However, previous work has
shown that Nakamoto consensus is not completely incentive
compatible [32, 60, 96].
Aside from incentives, protocol-level attacks exist that lower
the security threshold of Bitcoin below 51%. Selfish min-
ing [62] allows colluding miners to generate more valid blocks
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they were following the standard protocol. In selfish mining,
colluding miners withhold blocks that they have found, which
allows them to maintain a lead over the rest of the network,
who may waste their computational power on stale blocks.
When the network is about to catch up with the colluding
miners, the colluding miners release a portion of their withheld
blocks to the network. Using this mining strategy, it is possible
to conduct a 51% attack against the network with as little as
25% of the network’s computing power.
Systems like Fruitchain [114] aim to mitigate selfish mining
by using two independent mining processes on top of each
other: in addition to the PoW to create blocks, Fruitchain
requires an additional PoW to mine an new type of block,
called ‘fruits’. Blockchain transactions are included into these
fruits, and the fruits are included into the blocks created by the
first mining process. This mechanism prevents selfish miners
from dropping honest blocks from the blockchain by releasing
their withhold blocks because eventually, an honest block will
be created and will include back all the dropped fruits.
VI. PROOF-OF-X CONSENSUS
One of the biggest criticisms of Bitcoin is that it is based on
power-intensive PoW that has no external utility, and makes
it prone to centralization (Section V-D). These limitations of
PoW motivated a new class of consensus protocols based
on proof-of-X (PoX) that replace wasteful computations with
useful work derived from alternative commonly accessible
resources, or remove computational work altogether.
A. Proof-of-Stake
In proof-of-stake, participants vote on new blocks weighted
by their in-band investment such as the amount of currency
held in the blockchain. A number of recent systems have prov-
ably secure proof-of-stake protocols [50, 52, 83]. A common
theme in these systems is to randomly elect a leader from
among the stakeholders, which then appends a block to the
blockchain. Leader election may be public, that is the outcome
is visible to all the participants [50, 83]. Alternatively, in
a private election the participants use private information to
check if they have been selected as the leader, which can be
verified by all other participants using public information [52].
Private leader election is resilient to DoS attacks because
candidates privately check if they are elected before revealing
it publicly in their blocks, at which point it is too late to
DoS them. A malicious leader can censor transactions during
its epoch. But as leaders are re-elected sufficiently often, a
subsequent leader will add the censored transaction to the
blockchain (albeit some delay).
In Ouroboros [83], the participants (a random subset of all
stakeholders) run a multiparty coin-tossing protocol to agree
on a random seed. The participants then feed this seed to a
pseudo-random function defined by the protocol, that elects
the leader from among the participants in proportion to their
stake. The same random seed is used to elect the next set of
participants for the next epoch. Ouroboros distributes rewards
among all the participants regardless of whether or not they
win the election.
In Ouroboros Praos [52] and Snow-White [50] participants
independently determine if they have been elected. Snow-
White uses similar criteria for leader election as Bitcoin, that
is finding a pre-image that produces a hash below some target.
However, participants are limited to compute only one hash
per time step (assuming access to a weakly synchronized
clock) and the target takes into account each participant’s
amount of stake. Snow-White employs the incentive structure
of Fruitchain [114]: payouts are distributed equally among
fruits (Section V-E). In Ouroboros Praos, participants generate
a random number using a verifiable random function (VRF). If
the random number is below a threshold, it indicates that the
participant has been elected as the leader, who then broadcasts
the block along with the associated proof generated by the
VRF to the network. Ouroboros Praos inherits the incentive
structure of Ouroboros.
A challenge for proof-of-stake systems is to keep track of
the changing stakes of the stakeholders. Ouroboros requires
that shift in stakes is bounded, meaning the statistical distance
is limited over a certain number of epochs. Additionally,
Snow-White looks at stakes sufficiently far back in time to
ensure that everyone has agreed on the stake distribution.
Outside academia, some deployed cryptocurrencies incor-
porate proof-of-stake [4, 9], but their designs have not been
rigorously studied and they are not very popular. Ethereum
Foundation has been considering using proof-of-stake for some
time, but their work is still in progress [31].
1) Attacks and Mitigation: PoX results in three new attacks
compared to Nakamoto consensus [45]. The first is called
the nothing-at-stake attack where miners are incentivized to
extend every potential fork. Since it is computationally cheap
to extend a chain, in the case of forks rational miners mine
on top of every chain to increase the likelihood of getting
their block in the right chain. One way of dealing with this is
to introduce a penalty mechanism: a miner producing blocks
on different forks is penalized by having part of their stake
taken [50]. Another mitigation is to remove forks, at the cost
of a bigger overhead [70]. The second attack is called the
grinding attack where a miner re-creates a block multiple
times until it is likely that the miner can create a second block
shortly afterwards. This attack can be thwarted by ensuring
that a miner is not able to influence the next leader election
by using an unbiasable source of randomness or a deterministic
leader election. In the third attack called the long-range attack,
an attacker can bribe miners to sell their private keys. If these
keys had considerable value in the past, then the adversary
can mine previous blocks and re-write the entire history of the
blockchain. This is possible because the bribed miners have
already received their external utility for these coins (i.e., sold
the coins for fiat currency), and no longer have a stake in
the system. Thus the bribed miners can send their keys to the
adversary at almost no cost. This can be thwarted by central
checkpointing: some entity (e.g., one of the main developers)
declares that some blocks are final if they are sufficiently far
in time, or by requiring participants to lock their coins for a
longer period of time than the duration of their participation.
82) Alternatives: Bonneau et al. [33] describe informal
(and unpublished) consensus protocols based on proof-of-stake
that have been proposed in the cryptocurrency community.
Broadly, these system require miners to hold or prove the
ownership of coins. We list three variations of this theme,
though we note that this area has not seen significant advances.
• Proof-of-deposit: Miners ‘lock’ a certain amount of coins,
which they cannot spend for the duration of their mining.
One such system is Tendermint [88], where a miner’s voting
power is proportional to the amount of coins they have
locked.
• Proof-of-burn: Miners prove that they have destroyed a
quantity of coins, for example by sending them to a verifi-
ably unspendable address [10]. Slimcode [112] implemented
this approach in 2014 but has recently been discontinued.
• Proof-of-coin-age: Miners show possession of a quantity of
coins, where the quantity of coins is weighted by their coin-
age—the time since the coins were last moved. Peercoin [9]
adapts this approach.
B. Proof-of-Capacity
In proof-of-capacity, participants vote on new blocks
weighted by their capacity to allocate a non-trivial amount of
disk space. PermaCoin [102] repurposes Bitcoin’s PoW with
a more broadly useful task: providing a robust, distributed
storage. In PermaCoin, eligibility for the leader election re-
quires participants to also store segments of a large file. The
file is distributed by an authoritative ‘dealer’ who signs file
blocks. To provides censorship-resistant file storage, the file
is fully recoverable from the participants in the event of a
dealer failure or shutdown. SpaceMint [77] employs a consen-
sus protocol based on a non-interactive variant of proof-of-
capacity (called proof-of-space), where participants generate
and commit to a unique hard-to-pebble graph. PermaCoin and
SpaceMint have the same basic model as Nakamoto consensus,
so inherit Bitcoin’s incentivization mechanism, as well as its
resilience against censorship and DoS.
1) Attacks and Mitigation: Proof-of-capacity is vulnerable
to centralization due to participants outsourcing the file storage
to an external provider. To mitigate this problem, the proof-
of-retrievability in PermaCoin requires sequential read access
to blocks in a pseudorandom order: this directly increases
the bandwidth latency in case of outsourced storage, which
reduces the miner’s chance of finding a solution.
C. Proof-of-Elapsed-Time
Using the trusted enclave in Intel SGX, it is possible to
replace computational work with proof-of-elapsed-time [79].
Participants request a wait time from their enclave and the chip
with the shortest wait time is elected as the leader. The newly
elected leader can provide an attestation alongside the new
block to convince other participants that: (i) it indeed had the
shortest wait time, and (ii) that it did not broadcast the block
until after the wait time had expired.
An alternative approach is called Resource-Efficient Mining
(REM) [139] that proposes computing useful PoW using
trusted hardware. Every instruction cycle for the useful PoW
can be seen as a lottery ticket: if a cycle wins the lottery,
the participant is authorized to mint a new block. To extend
this model to arbitrary work, the authors introduce a two-layer
hierarchical attestation. The first layer certifies that useful PoW
was performed, and the second layer attests that the program
(and its input) incremented the counter for instruction cycles
appropriately. A hash of both layers is sent alongside a new
block to prove that the participant was authorized to mint it.
1) Attacks and Mitigation: Both proof-of-elapsed-time ap-
proaches suffer from two limitations. First, breaking a single
piece of trusted hardware enables the attacker to always win
the lottery. Both Sawtooth and REM argue that a statistical
analysis of newly minted blocks suffices to detect whether
a chip can be compromised. Second, the stale chip problem
highlights that it is advantageous to collect chips as this
increases the probability of minting a new block (i.e., every
new chips is an additional lottery ticket). REM provides an
economic analysis to show that a miner’s revenue source
originates from useful work, and not farming chips.
VII. HYBRID CONSENSUS: SINGLE COMMITTEE
A single consensus node suffers from poor performance as
well as safety limitations such as weak consistency and low
fault-tolerance. This has resulted in a shift towards consensus
protocols where a committee—rather than a single node—
collectively drives the consensus.
A. Committee Formation
Committee formation refers to the criteria used to allow
nodes to join a committee. This is an important aspect of
decentralized, permissionless systems to thwart sybil attacks.
1) Permissioned: Permissioned blockchains operate in a
trusted environment where nodes are granted committee mem-
bership based on organizational policy. Hyperledger [37] is
one such system that supports smart contracts. There is a
hierarchy of trust, with some nodes being fully trusted while
others only partially trusted. This allows for a modular design
where transaction validation is performed by the fully trusted
nodes (or endorsers) while the semi-trusted nodes (ordering
nodes) order the transactions and add these to the blockchain.
In Hyperledger, clients first submit their transactions to the
endorsers who execute the smart contract. A transaction is
only submitted to a subset of endorsers according to the policy
of the respective smart contract. As different smart contracts
can designate different endorsers, execution can take place
in parallel. Clients collect matching signed results and smart
contract state updates from sufficient number of endorsers,
and submit these to the ordering nodes which append it to the
blockchain using a consensus protocol.
2) Proof-of-work: In these systems, nodes are allowed to
join the committee based on PoW. In ByzCoin, the consensus
committee is dynamically formed by a window of recent min-
ers. Each miner has voting power proportional to its number
of mining blocks in the current window, which is proportional
to its hash power. When a miner finds a solution to the
puzzle, it becomes a member of the committee and receives a
share in the consensus. Solidus and Omniledger have a similar
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proof-of-stake to allocate committee membership based on
directly invested stake instead of power-wasteful work. A
public randomness or cryptographic sortition protocol is run
within the current committee to select the next committee from
the current stakeholder distribution defined in the ledger.
3) Lottery: Candidates are promoted to committee mem-
bership based on the outcome of a lottery. In Algorand, all
candidates have a public key, and get chosen to become a com-
mittee member using cryptographic sortition. This involves the
candidates running a verifiable random function and seeing if
the output is below a certain value.
B. Committee Configuration
The way a committee is configured has safety and per-
formance implications. Permissioned systems usually assume
static committee members, but sybil resistance in a permission-
less and decentralized setting requires dynamic membership.
1) Static: In static setting, the committee members are
not periodically changed. This is the typical configuration in
permissioned systems like Hyperledger and RSCoin where
committee members have known, trusted identities and the
threat model does not include sybil attacks.
2) Rolling (Single): The committee is updated in a sliding
window fashion: new miner(s) are added to the current com-
mittee and the oldest members are ejected. In ByzCoin, each
miner has voting power proportional to the number of mining
blocks it has in the current window, which is proportional to
its hash power. When a miner finds a solution to the puzzle,
it becomes a member of the current consensus group and
receives a share in the current window which moves one step
forwards (ejecting the oldest miner).
An important aspect of reconfiguration is wedging, that is
to stop the old committee from approving more transactions
without losing any transactions it is processing at the time
of reconfiguration. Solidus updates its committee similarly to
ByzCoin, but a new miner joining the committee can propose
transactions only once. This binds transaction proposals to
reconfiguration, so it is no longer possible for an old com-
mittee to approve transactions concurrent to a reconfiguration
event. Another issue is how to resolve leader contention when
two miners simultaneously solve a PoW puzzle. Solidus uses
a Paxos-style leader election where a higher ranked leader
can interrupt a lower ranked leader. Ranks are derived from
leaders’ PoW solutions and supplementary epoch numbers. To
ensure safety, the new leader must propose a value that has
been (or may be) committed.
A reconfigurable committee needs some mechanism to track
committee membership. In Peercensus [53], a new member is
allowed to join the committee following a collective decision
which involves validating that the member is reachable over
the network. Committee members use a failure detector (e.g.,
by sending regular ping messages) to detect when a member
has left the committee. If a member finds another to be
unreachable, it can propose ‘leave’ for the absent member
and the committee membership is updated after a collective
decision is made by the committee. A limitation of this
approach is that malicious members can slow down or stall
the system by constantly generating false alarms for eviction
of legitimate members. Addressing this would require rate-
limiting the number of leave operations a member can propose
in a given time interval.
3) Full: Lottery-based systems like Algorand and Snow-
White select the committee members for each epoch using
randomness generated based on previous blocks.
4) Rolling (Multiple): Omniledger uses cryptographic sor-
tition to select a subset of the committee to be swapped out
and replaced with new members. This is done in such a way
that the ratio between honest and byzantine members in a
committee is maintained. This also has the benefit that the
system is operational during reconfiguration as the operational
members can continue to process transactions while a fraction
of the committee is being reconfigured and bootstrapped.
C. Consensus Protocol
Most committee-based systems use classical BFT consensus
protocols such as PBFT. In this section we focus on modifi-
cations to classical BFT protocols or their novel compositions
to tailor them for use in blockchains.
In Solidus, the leader is external to the committee and
can propose transactions and PoW to nominate itself as
a committee member only once to the committee. If the
committee agrees, they approve the proposed transactions and
allow the miner to join the committee in the next round. The
proposal, that has now become a decision, also serves as the
next puzzle and is propagated to all miners. This approach
is motivated by a safety problem in PBFT’s ‘stable’ leader
which can potentially manipulate reconfiguration by waiting
for a malicious miner to solve the puzzle, and later nominating
it on to the committee—allowing the committee to gradually
become dominated by corrupt members.
ByzCoin organizes the consensus committee into a commu-
nication tree where the most recent miner (the leader) is at the
root. The leader runs PBFT [44] to get all members to agree
on the next block. However, it replaces PBFT’s O(n2) MAC-
authenticated all-to-all communication with a primitive called
scalable collective signing (CoSi) that reduces messaging
complexity to O(n). The outcome of running two rounds
of PBFT with CoSi is a fixed 64 byte collective signature
that proves that at least two-thirds of the committee members
witnessed and attested the block. A node in the network can
verify in O(1) time that a block has been validated.
A malicious committee leader can potentially censor trans-
actions by not proposing them; this does not compromise
safety, but it can negatively affect fairness. Omniledger deals
with this issue by allowing non-leader committee members
to propose a transaction if they suspect that it has been
censored by the leader (since they can ‘hear’ all messages
because of the gossip protocol for information dissemination).
In Chainspace and ByzCoin, transaction-censorship triggers
leader re-election (or view change). Elastico does not discuss
censorship by committee leader. Classic BFT protocols often
rely on a timeout to detect censorship or unreliability by a
leader, and thus liveness and censorship resistance rest on a
partial synchronous network assumption.
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In the context of BFT-based committees, DoS means that all
the honest members in the committee are taken offline. This
is challenging, and made further difficult by how frequently
and what fraction of committee membership changes (epoch,
dynamism). ByzCoin has medium DoS resistance because the
committee configuration is rolling (single). Elastico has high
resistance within single committees because full committees
are reconfigured (full swap), but in the absence of an intra-
shard consensus mechanism, an adversary can flood the system
with transactions that touch multiple committees causing a
deadlock. Omniledger further enhances ByzCoin’s efficient
BFT protocol with O(n) messaging complexity by using a
more robust group communication pattern. This addresses
an issue in the original protocol where node failures cause
ByzCoin to fall back on a more robust all-to-all communi-
cation pattern that significantly degrades system performance.
Chainspace does not include details on intra-committee con-
figuration, hence it only provides medium level of resistance
against DoS attacks.
Systems based on proof-of-stake consensus (e.g., Ouroboros
Praos and Algorand) achieve DoS protection by privately
electing committees. This ensures that participants cannot
learn whether another participant is a committee member and
only learns this when the newly elected member announces
this. In Algorand, users check for themselves whether or not
they should play a role in the committee for the next round
by seeing if, on input a seed known only to the user, the
output of a verifiable random function is less than a certain
value; this ensures that only they know what roles (if any) they
should play in the committee. Once the roles are fixed, users
then participate according to their role in the BA⋆ consensus
protocol, which is a variant of PBFT that allows the set of
participating servers to rotate. As participants start playing
their roles, they can include information in their messages that
allows other participants to check that they are in fact eligible.
Hyperledger uses pluggable and modular consensus in
which the consensus protocol can be specified by the smart
contract policy. For example, Hyperledger supports a CFT ser-
vice based on Apache Kafka [2] and its ZooKeeper unit [78],
and more recently a PBFT-variant BFTSmart [30]. Because of
their trust assumptions, permissioned systems are resilient to
DoS and censorship of transactions by the committee.
D. Incentives
Classical BFT protocols assume two kinds of players:
cooperative and byzantine. This assumption works well in
centralized settings where nodes are controlled by the same
entity or federation. However, decentralized networks that rely
on volunteer nodes need to provide incentives for participation.
Most committee-based systems such as ByzCoin use the
same incentive model as Bitcoin; however, instead of the
most recent miner receiving all reward and fee, it is shared
between members of the committee in proportion to their
shares. ByzCoin states that to ensure that members remain
active after joining the committee, they will also be rewarded
for participation (e.g., upon completion of PBFT pre-prepare
and commit phases); however, details have not been provided.
In general, consensus protocols assume two kind of players:
honest and byzantine. Solidus argues that with no clear incen-
tives, the honest (or altruistic) committee members have noth-
ing to gain from participating in the consensus. To alleviate
this, Solidus introduces a third kind of player: a rational player
that assesses its expected utility in terms of Solidus coins.
Solidus argues that equal distribution of rewards between all
committee members can lead to a situation where members
can suppress reconfiguration to stay on the committee and
continue to collect rewards. To address this, Solidus rewards
the committee members that are the fastest to endorse reconfig-
uration creating a competition. Moreover, the external leader
gets all the transaction fees, while the mining reward is split
between the external leader and the committee members. This
ensures that committee members do not have an incentive to
delay reconfiguration due to a possible high transaction fee.
Solidus includes incentives for information propagation and
present a game-theoretic analysis that a miners best strategy
is to propagate the PoW puzzle and charge a small fee.
Smart contract platforms require clients to include fees
to be paid to the nodes that execute the smart contracts.
This not only helps to incentivize node participation, but
also protects the system from overuse by discouraging clients
from submitting long computations that monopolize system
resources. Ethereum clients have to pay ‘gas’ in proportion to
the cost of executing the contract [136].
VIII. HYBRID CONSENSUS: MULTIPLE COMMITTEES
While single-committee consensus significantly improves
performance over single-node consensus, a major limitation is
that it is not scalable: adding more members to the committee
decreases throughput. This motivated the design of consensus
based on multiple committees. To make the system scalable,
transactions are split among multiple committees (shards)
which then process these transactions in parallel.
A. Committee Topology
When multiple committees are involved in consensus, an
important question is how they will be organized in terms
of topology. Chainspace and Omniledger have flat topologies,
that is all committees are at the same level. Elastico has a
hierarchical topology in which a number of ‘normal’ com-
mittees validate transactions, and a leader committee orders
these transactions and extends the blockchain. In RSCoin [51]
(a permissioned blockchain), the central bank controls all
monetary supply, while mintettes authorized by the bank
validate a subset (shard) of transactions. The transactions that
pass validation are submitted to the central bank which adds
them to the blockchain.
B. Intra-committee Configuration
In permissioned systems, the process of assigning nodes
to committees is usually done statically according to the
policy of the federation. Another approach is to dynamically
allocate nodes to committees. This should be done randomly
to stop an adversary from concentrating its presence in one
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committee and exceeding the byzantine-tolerance threshold.
Permissioned systems like RSCoin can use a trusted source
of randomness for committee reconfiguration, but this can be
problematic in a permissionless setting which would require
a shared random coin [48, 71]. However, generating good
randomness in a distributed way is a known hard problem:
current best solutions tolerate up to 1/6 fraction of byzantine
peers, while incurring a high message complexity [20]. Among
the more recent solutions, RandHerd [128] provides a scalable,
secure multi-party computation protocol that offers unbiasable,
decentralized randomness in a byzantine setting.
Omniledger periodically reconfigures committees to ensure
that a committee is never compromised. This is achieved by
a secure shard reconfiguration protocol, based on RandHerd,
that committee members run periodically and autonomously.
In every epoch, a random subset of members is replaced
with new set of members that registered their interest in the
previous epoch. The swap operation is done such that liveness
is maintained during reconfiguration events because a subset
of committee members continues to be operational.
Elastico operates in epochs: assignment of nodes to com-
mittees is valid only for duration of the epoch. At the end of
the epoch, nodes compute solution to a puzzle seeded by a
random string generated by the final committee and sends the
solution to the final committee to be assigned to a committee.
As a result, in each epoch a node is paired with different
nodes in a committee managing a different set of transactions.
The number of committees scales linearly in the amount of
computational power available in the system, but the number
of nodes within a committee is fixed.
Chainspace has abstracted details of committee reconfigu-
ration and it is up to policy enforced via a smart contract
to decide how nodes will be allocated to committees. Nodes
can be added (and removed) to committees by their members
through majority (2f + 1) voting.
C. Intra-committee Consensus
In a multi-committee system, some transactions might in-
volve coordination between multiple committees. Such trans-
actions might require access and manipulation of state that is
handled by different committees. The intra-committee consen-
sus ensures that this takes place consistently and atomically
across all concerned committees.
Omniledger uses an atomic commit protocol to process
transactions across committees. A transaction submitted by a
client is processed by the committees that manage its inputs.
Each related committee validates the transaction, and returns
a proof-of-acceptance (or rejection) to the client, and locks
the transaction inputs. To unlock the inputs, the client sends
proof-of-accepts to the committees that manage the transaction
outputs, who add the transaction to the next block to be
appended. If the transaction fails the validation test, the client
can send proof-of-rejection to the input committees to roll back
the transaction and unlock the inputs.
In RSCoin, communication between committee members
takes place indirectly through the client (similar to Om-
niledger), and it also relies on the client to ensure completion
of transactions. A client first gets signed ‘clearance’ from
majority of the mintettes that manage the transaction inputs.
Next the client sends the transaction and signed clearance to
mintettes corresponding to transaction outputs. The mintettes
check validity of the transactions and verify signed evi-
dence from input mintettes that the transaction is not double-
spending any inputs. If the checks pass, the mintettes adds
the transaction to be included in the next block. The system
operates in epochs: at the end of each epoch, mintettes send
all cleared transactions to the central bank which collates
transactions into blocks that are added to the blockchain.
Client-driven atomic commit protocols like Omniledger and
RSCoin are vulnerable to DoS if the client stops participating
and the inputs are locked forever. These systems make the
assumption that clients are incentivized to proceed to the
unlock phase. Such incentives may exist in a cryptocurrency
application where an unresponsive client will lose its own
coins if the inputs are permanently locked, but do not hold
for a general-purpose platform where transaction inputs may
have shared ownership. Instead of a client-driven approach,
Chainspace runs an atomic commit protocol collaboratively
between all the concerned committees. This is achieved by
making the entire committees act as resource managers for
the transactions they manage.
IX. DISCUSSION
A. Integrating BFT protocols into blockchains
The renewed interest in BFT protocols, in the context of
blockchain, has led to more mature and efficient variants of
those protocols, or variants that leverage new assumptions.
Here we discuss several open problems that still remain.
1) ‘Open’ vs ‘closed’ asynchronous protocols: A number
of recent scalable blockchain protocols, such as RSCoin [51],
Omniledger [85] and Chainspace [18], employ traditional
byzantine consensus protocols for scalability and sharding.
However, those consensus protocols are inherently ‘closed’,
in the sense that replicas need to have authenticated channels
between them, long term interactions with each other, and can
only tolerate f byzantine nodes. Thus, traditional consensus
protocols cannot accommodate open participation of nodes and
high churn, and are vulnerable to sybil attacks [57].
Newer BFT protocols, such as Honeybadger [104], even
overcome impossibility results, and provide both safety and
liveness in a fully asynchronous setting, through a randomized
consensus algorithm. While this breakthrough, building upon
the earlier work by Cachin et al. [39] is of notable theoretical
value, it does not resolve the issue of the need for a ‘closed’
group and therefore those solutions cannot be a drop-in
replacement for open Nakamoto consensus. Such random-
ized BFT protocols have traditionally been more expensive
than deterministic ones, both in terms of communication and
cryptographic operation costs. Byzantine consensus protocols,
besides Nakamoto consensus, in the context of open group
participation is still an open research problem.
2) Exploiting advances in hardware and cryptography:
The most mature current implementation of BFT is the Java
BFTSmart [30] library with message complexityO(N2) in the
12
size of the quorum N . However, Byzcoin [84] uses modern
signature schemes to optimistically relay all messages through
a leader, reducing the common case of BFT consensus to
O(N). The XFT [94] protocol, on the other hand, improves
the efficiency of consensus by relaxing the threat model. It
considers that byzantine nodes may act arbitrarily, however
links between honest nodes are reliable and eventually syn-
chronous. This leads to a simplification of the view change and
steady state BFT protocol. Finally, some consensus protocols
are now leveraging secure hardware executions environments:
the Intel Sawtooth lake system uses the Intel SGX and related
trusted execution environments to perform the duties related to
ordering transactions, while ensuring safety and liveness [117].
3) Identity management: In BFT consensus protocols, a
malicious member can potentially generate spoofed responses
on behalf of other members to bias majority in its favour. To
counter this attack, BFT committees assume that there exist
point-to-point, authenticated channels between all members,
which requires some mechanism to track committee members
and their keys. Tracking membership and key distribution in
dynamic permissionless committees is challenging, and most
systems abstract these details.
A naı¨ve solution is for all nodes to regularly broadcast
their identity to the entire network (along with evidence that
they have been granted permission to join the committee)
resulting in O(n2) messages. A better approach to is to form
a special committee that offers directory services to new
committee members [95]. However, this presents a dilemma:
a static committee undermines decentralization, but forming
a decentralized directory committee suffers from the same
challenges as the committee aims to solve in the first place.
Another technique, used by Omniledger [85], is to record
committee members for each round in a separate ‘identity’
blockchain—however, its details are not provided. In multi-
committee systems, intra-committee interaction further re-
quires each committee to have a collective identity, and some
way for the committees to discover each other.
B. Committee-based approaches
1) Secure committees: The idea of scaling services built
on state machine replication (SMR) by splitting state (or
sharding) among multiple committees (also called partitions
or shards) has been well-studied in the context of traditional
distributed systems [48, 71, 91]. The key challenge in these
systems is to ensure linearizability by atomically executing
operations that span multiple committees. More recent opti-
mizations enable elastic SMR so that committees can dynam-
ically merge (scale up) and split (scale out) their state for
load-balancing purposes [109]. These systems employ fault-
tolerant BFT protocols at their core as the nodes are controlled
by a single entity or a group of entities that collectively
govern the system. Due to similar governance assumptions,
these techniques can be extended to permissioned blockchains.
However, sharding permissionless blockchains with byzantine
adversaries is challenging and tackled by only a few recent
systems [18, 85, 95]. Individual committees can tolerate up to
33% of malicious members, but if this is not the case then the
malicious committee can compromise all the transactions that
touch the bad committee. This is an outstanding issue shared
by all multi-committee blockchains. Future research should
focus on developing robust mechanisms to detect malicious
committees and to recover from them.
Chainspace starts mitigating this issue by making the author
of the smart contract responsible to designate the parts of
the infrastructure that are trusted to maintain the integrity
of its contract; the contract’s integrity only depend on their
correctness (as well as the correctness of contract sub-calls).
Moreover, Chainspace provides an auditing mechanism allow-
ing honest node in honest committees to detect inconsistencies
and discover the malicious committee; there are however no
systems today providing a recovery mechanism.
Finally, sharded solutions achieve a different notion of
verifiability from solutions that rely on a single committee (or
are fully decentralized), as it is no longer clear how to define a
global set of transactions. In Omniledger and Chainspace, for
example, every committee defines its own blockchain, and in
RSCoin the separate sets of transactions agreed upon by each
shard are combined only through the use of a central entity.
We leave it as an interesting research problem to quantify the
difference, in terms of public verifiability, between sharded
and non-sharded solutions.
2) Bootstrapping committees: The biggest threat to the
integrity of a permissionless committee is from an adversary
that might create sybil identities and take over the whole
committee. As discussed in Section VII-A, prominent ap-
proaches include using PoW or PoX to allow nodes to join
the committee. A limitation here is that the biggest miners will
have a greater likelihood of dominating the committee, though
at the cost of significantly more hashing power than required
for single-leader PoW systems. Other PoX alternatives have
been proposed but these suffer from similar issues.
Multi-committee systems raise the additional issue of how
to map nodes to committees. One approach is to randomly
map nodes to committees [85, 95]. However, this prohibits
finer governance. General-purpose platforms like Chainspace
might have different policies within committees; for example
some committees can be permissioned while others are per-
missionless. In this case it might be useful to enforce node-
to-shard mapping via smart contracts that allow a node to join
a committee trusted by the smart contract provider.
Another consideration for bootstrapping committees is to
achieve coercion resistance, in the form of requiring enormous
effort for an adversary to suppress the overall operation of the
system. Systems such as Tor [55] have survived in a highly
adversarial environment despite parts of its infrastructure,
namely directory authorities, being a closed consensus group.
These authorities are distributed geographically, and are under
different jurisdictions and managed by different organizations.
Furthermore, like blockchains, they only handle high-integrity
operations—not privacy-sensitive ones—making their audit
and also replacement in case of unreliability, easier despite
being manual. This is a hopeful example, illustrating that
even small closed groups may, through careful selection of
participants, provide sufficient protection against coercion.
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C. Incentives and governance in consensus protocols
Decentralized networks need to incentivize nodes for active
participation in different operations such as consensus [84, 85,
95], information propagation [16, 21, 28], and executing smart
contracts [18, 136]. Recently there has been a shift towards
incentive-compatible consensus protocols, where incentives
are built into the core of the protocol. Solidus argues that
cooperative players in the classical BFT protocols are replaced
by rational players in the decentralized setting, who are
motivated to maximize their utility [16]. To ensure that rational
players participate in all phases of the protocol, incentives
should be distributed among them such that they can only be
claimed after the completion of each phase. This is a new but
important observation. This implies that the committee should
be reconfigured regularly to maintain a suitable committee
size: large committees might result in trivial rewards for
individual committee members (or might lead to inflation of
client fees to account for the difference).
An important question is: who distributes the incentives?
In Solidus the leader of the committee distributes incentives
among the first 2f + 1 responders. This approach has several
limitations: (i) a faulty or malicious leader might not divide the
rewards, (ii) there is no way to enforce that the leader rewards
the genuinely fast responders, so the leader can instead wait for
its favourite members to reply, and (iii) the notion of ‘fast’ is
problematic in decentralized networks where members located
farther from the leader are at a natural disadvantage.
Broadly, incentivization in PoW blockchains has seen some
study [87]: major limitations have been identified [42, 62,
107, 120], and possible solutions have been proposed [140].
Similarly, in the context of protocols where creating a block
is cheap, good incentives are crucial to prevent attacks on
the system, but have not been carefully analyzed. The inves-
tigation of these issues in BFT protocols is likewise far from
mature, and non-existent in multi-committee protocols where
the incentives need to be extended to intra-committee opera-
tions. This area will benefit from combining formal economic
and game theoretic analysis with cryptography, such as has
already been done in the blockchain community [86, 116].
Techniques such as rational cryptography [36, 65] and the
BAR model [17], which considers Byzantine, altruistic, and
rational agents, could also be adapted to work here.
Beyond concrete incentivization to participate in the pro-
tocol, it is important to consider also what makes protocols
attractive to participants in the first place, and what makes
them think their investment in a given system will be re-
paid. These broader types of incentive are both related to
the governance of the system, in terms of identifying the
entities who define its rules, and the extent to which the
protocol is able to evolve. It is ultimately a relatively unstudied
question at this point what types of governance structures
would provide the strongest incentivization, or the extent to
which these structures are taken into account when participants
are deciding which protocol to join. This area would benefit
from social science-based analysis.
D. Privacy in consensus
By their very nature transparent distributed ledgers pose sig-
nificant privacy challenges with respect to both the information
contained in them, as well as the privacy of transactions and
their meta-data. The original Bitcoin announcement promised
‘anonymity’ as a property of the new system; however, the
weak form of pseudonymity offered can be bypassed by
tracing attacks [101].
Permissioned systems, such as BigchainDB [100], have
the ability to protect privacy by restricting the set of core
participants in the consensus to a small vetted set—that are
assumed to be trusted both for the integrity (safety) of the
systems, its liveness, and can also be trusted for keeping
secrets (privacy). However, trusting a set of entities for privacy
is of a different nature than trusting them for integrity: if
information is replicated any node may violate the property,
and such a violation cannot be detected within the system—
since it only involves leaking secrets. Furthermore, relying on
permissioned ledgers for privacy forces the system to rely on
closed groups, for reasons besides efficiency of consensus—
making this design choice hard to change.
Protocol-layer techniques for protecting privacy also have
implications for scalability. The most established exemplar of
this family is Zcash [26], where a transaction contains a suc-
cinct non-interactive zero-knowledge proof (zk-SNARK) [74],
proving that it is spending an existing unspent coin, but with-
out publicly specifying which one. The cost of constructing
such SNARKs and verifying them, as well as their size,
affects the efficiency and scalability of protocols. Furthermore,
since coins are spent in private, it is impossible to prune
past transactions to maintain a smaller Unspent Transaction
Output (utxo), and checkpointing is ineffective. Thus the state
necessary to validate transactions grows indefinitely.
From a systems perspective, such systems expose the min-
imum amount of information for validation, and to agree
on a consensus on the ordering of transactions—while the
actual construction and execution of transactions happens
off-chain between the parties having visibility into the full
secrets. The Chainspace platform applies this privacy pat-
tern to general smart contracts [18]. Others [134] argue that
distributed ledgers can decouple the ordering—performed in
public on cryptographic commitments of transactions—from
the validation containing private information, that is only
checked by a trusted cabal. Such architectures can scale at the
same rate as the core ordering protocol, but do not provide
any universal end-to-end verifiability.
X. CONCLUSIONS
The last few years have seen a dramatic surge in blockchain
consensus protocols, as a result of which the field has grown
increasingly complex. We presented a comprehensive system-
atization of blockchain consensus protocols, and evaluated
their performance and security properties using a novel frame-
work. In a broader context, this work has highlighted a number
of open areas and challenges related to: (i) gaps between
BFT and blockchains, (ii) security vs. performance tradeoffs,
(iii) incentives, and (iv) privacy. This longitudinal perspective
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makes a timely contribution to the prolific and vibrant area
of blockchain consensus protocols: the wide-scale adoption of
blockchains is constrained by their performance and scalability
limitations, and is desperately in need of new and faster
consensus protocols that can cater to varying security and
privacy requirements.
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B. Glossary
• Adversary model: The fraction of malicious or faulty
nodes that the consensus protocol can tolerate (i.e., it will
operate correctly despite the presence of such nodes).
• Code available: Whether the code implementing the
system is publicly available.
• Committee: How the participants work together to par-
ticipate in the consensus protocol; either they all work
together (single committee), or they are divided in mul-
tiple subgroups (multiple committees).
• Committee Formation: How the members of the commit-
tee are chosen, for example via proof-of-work, proof-of-
stake, trusted hardware etc.
• Consistency: The likelihood that the system will reach
consensus on a proposed value; it can be either strong or
weak.
• DoS resistance: Resilience of the node(s) involved in
consensus to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. If the par-
ticipants of the consensus protocol are known in advance,
an adversary may launch a DoS attack against them.
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• Experimental setup: The configuration used to generate
the numbers reported for throughput and latency.
• Incentives: The mechanisms that keep nodes motivated to
participate in the system and follow its rules.
• Inter-committee Configuration: How the members are
assigned to the committee in a single committee setting;
either members serve on the committee permanently
(static), or they are changed at regular intervals (rolling,
or full swap).
• Inter-committee Consensus: Reaching agreement on a
value among nodes in a single committee.
• Intra-committee configuration: How the members are
assigned to the committees in a multiple committees
setting; it can be static or dynamic.
• Intra-committee Consensus: Reaching agreement on a
value among nodes across multiple committees; this can
be optionally mediated by an external party (e.g., the
client).
• Latency: The time it takes from when a transaction is
proposed until consensus has been reached on it.
• Leader: The leader of the consensus protocol, which can
be either elected among the current committee (inter-
nally), externally, or flexibly (e.g., through arbitrary smart
contracts).
• Participants: The nodes that participate in the consensus
protocol.
• Permissioned blockchain: Only participants selected by
the appropriate authorities can participate in the consen-
sus protocol.
• Permissionless blockchain: Anyone can join the system
and participate in the consensus protocol.
• Scalability: The system’s ability to achieve greater
throughput when consensus involves a larger number of
nodes.
• Throughput: The maximum rate at which transactions can
be agreed upon by the consensus protocol (transactions
per second/hour).
• Transaction censorship resistance: The system’s re-
silience to proposed transactions being suppressed (i.e.,
censored) by malicious node(s) involved in consensus.
